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II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Temporary Sobriety Checkpoint Roadblocks
The use of temporary sobriety checkpoints to stop cars in an
effort to detect alcohol-impaired drivers is now a violation of the
Minnesota Constitution. In Ascher v. Commissioner of Public
Safety,' the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a temporary sobriety checkpoint roadblock constituted
an unreasonable search and seizure under the Minnesota
Constitution.' The court held that absent objective, individual
articulable suspicion, sobriety checkpoint roadblocks are violative
of the Minnesota Constitution as unreasonable searches and
seizures.3
From 10:00 p.m. on August 14, 1992, to 2:00 a.m. on August
15, 1992, the Burnsville Police Department and the Minnesota
State Patrol conducted a temporary sobriety checkpoint road-
block at the intersection of Nicollet Avenue and Highway 13 in
Burnsville, Minnesota.4 The checkpoint was initiated as an
effort to apprehend alcohol-impaired drivers.5 Officers inter-
viewed each driver at a "pre-screen area" near the intersection
checking for indicia of intoxication.6 If the interviewing police
officer suspected a possible violation, the driver was then taken
to a "final screen area" for further investigation including a
sobriety test and computer check for outstanding warrants.7
Representatives of two local television stations were also present
at the "final screen area" filming segments of the screening
procedure in an effort to deter future violators.'
1. 519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1994).
2. Id. at 183-84.
3. Id. at 187.
4. Id. at 184. Although signs were placed alongside the road warning motorists
of the approaching checkpoint, there was no way for motorists to bypass it. Id.
5. Id. Originally, police officers at the checkpoint were directed to stop every car
entering the checkpoint However, due to unusually heavy traffic, ranking officers
decided to stop every fourth car. Id.
6. Id. The average delay experienced by the stopped motorists was estimated at
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One of the drivers stopped at the sobriety checkpoint was
Ricky Ascher.9 Ascher was sent to the "final screen area" upon
a Burnsville police officer's observation that Ascher displayed
physical indicia of intoxication.'1 After performing several field
sobriety tests and taking a preliminary breath test, Ascher was
arrested and taken to the police station where he refused to
submit to an intoxilyzer test."
Ascher subsequently sought review of his driver's license
revocation in connection with the arrest. 2 The Dakota County
District Court sustained the revocation. The Minnesota Court
of Appeals reversed the order of the district court concluding
that the media's presence at the sobriety roadblock rendered the
stop impermissibly intrusive under the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution and that the roadblock violated Article I,
Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. 4 The Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed. 5
In reaching its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court
recognized that a substantial segment of our society may be
willing to submit to a short term invasion of their privacy to keep
alcohol-impaired drivers off the road.'6 However, the court
refused to base its decision on what the court described as public
"consensus that a particular law enforcement technique serves a
laudable purpose." 17 Additionally, the court refused to examine
the effectiveness of such a roadblock.'" Instead, the court
based its decision on Minnesota's long-recognized requirement
that police possess an objective, individualized, articulable




12. Id. at 183.
13. Id.
14. Ascher v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 505 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
15. Id. at 183.
16. Id. at 186.
17. Id. at 186-87 (citing Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 459
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
18. Id. at 185. As a result of the roadblock, 2.3% of the stopped motorists were
issued citations or arrested including fourteen arrests for DWI, four arrests for
DAR/DAS, one arrest for open bottle, one arrest for possession of cocaine, one arrest
for driving an unregistered vehicle, and one arrest of a fugitive. Id. at 184.
[Vol. 22
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By exercising its independent authority to interpret the
Minnesota Constitution, the court circumvented the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz which held that the use of temporary roadblocks is not
violative of the Fourth Amendment.2" In fact, the court relied
heavily on Justice Brennan's fervent dissent in Sitz in striking
down the use of temporary roadblocks as unconstitutional.21 In
Sitz, Justice Brennan chided the majority for ignoring previous
court decisions requiring the government to prove reasonable
suspicion even in minimally-intrusive seizure situations and
underscored the concern that if temporary roadblocks were
allowed the public would be vulnerable to "arbitrary or harassing
conduct by the police."22
The court's decision in Ascher properly protects the personal
liberties found in the Minnesota Constitution to a greater extent
than required by the U.S. Constitution. Although harmonious
interpretations of state and federal constitutional provisions may
often be favorable, Ascher is representative of a situation where
departure from an interpretation of a federal provision resulted
in an enhanced right of Minnesota citizens to be free from
arbitrary and harassing police conduct.
B. Term Limits of Elected Officials Relative to Home Rule Charter
Cities
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Minneapolis Term Limits
Coalition v. Keefe,23 considered the constitutionality of a pro-
posed amendment to the Minneapolis city charter limiting the
terms of local elected officials. 24  The court held that the
19. Id. at 187. As an example of a recognized exception to the requirement of
individualized suspicion the court cited a situation where development of individualized
suspicion by police was impracticable, the suspicionless interference did not outweigh
the private citizens' interest in freedom from invasion of privacy and the police attained
a higher arrest rate. Id. at 186.
20. Id. at 185; see Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990)
(suggesting that the minimal invasion experienced by the brief detention of a motorist
at a temporary roadblock would only be violative of the Fourth Amendment when there
is no empirical evidence that the roadblock was effective).
21. Ascher, 519 N.W.2d at 185.
22. Id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 457-58).
23. 535 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1995).
24. Id. at 307.
1996]
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proposed amendment to the Minneapolis city charter would
violate Article VII, Section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution
25
because a term limit constituted an eligibility requirement rather
than a qualification for office. 6
On August 15, 1994, the Minneapolis Term Limits Coalition,
an unincorporated association, filed a petition with the Office of
Elections and Voter Registration in an attempt to place a
proposed charter amendment on the November 8, 1994, general
election ballot.27 The proposed charter amendment limited the
terms of the Minneapolis mayor and city council to eight
years. 8 On August 31, the director of the Office of Elections
25. Article VII, Section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Eligibility to hold office. Every person who by the provisions of this
article is entitled to vote at any election and is 21 years of age is eligible for
any office elective by the people in the district wherein he has resided 30 days
previous to the election except as otherwise provided in this constitution, or
the constitution and law of the United States.
MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
26. Minneapolis Term Limits Coalition, 535 N.W.2d at 309.
27. Id. at 307. Pursuant to Article XII, Section 5 of the Minnesota Constitution,
a home rule charter amendment may be proposed by a petition signed by five percent
of the voters of the local government unit, by a charter commission, or "by any other
manner provided by law." Id. at 308.
28. The proposed amendment to the city charter stated as follows:
SECTION 1. TERM LIMITS. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the
contrary, no person may file to be a candidate for election to a term that
would cause the person to serve more than eight consecutive years in the
office of Mayor or eight consecutive years in the office of City Council. Service
prior to the passage of this ordinance shall not count in determining length
of service.
SECTION 2. INSTRUCTION. The city clerk is hereby instructed to contact, exactly
as he would do if so instructed by a resolution of the Mayor or City Council,
in writing, within 30 days after adoption of this ordinance, all state legislators
and members of the United States Congress who have any constituents within
the city limits and instruct them it is the resolute desire of the citizens of the
city of Minneapolis that term limits be enacted by the legislature of Minnesota
and the United States Congress, and that the maximum consecutive tenure in
office be no more than six years (three terms) in the United States House or
[sic] Representatives, no more than twelve years (two terms) in the United
States Senate, and no more than ten consecutive years in either the Minnesota
State Senate or State House. The people of the city of Minneapolis hereby
instruct all state and federal legislators representing any part of this city, to
individually do their utmost to promote and pass binding legislation or a
* constitutional amendment enacting the term limits specified in this section.
The instruction and resolution shall remain in effect for as many years as
required to effect these changes, and shall so state on its face.
SECTION 3. SEVERABILITY. If any part of this petition shall be declared
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and Voter Registration certified that the petition fulfilled the
requisite number of registered voter signatures.29
On September 12, 1994, the entire Minneapolis city council
decided not to place the proposed term limit amendment on the
ballot.' The city council based its decision on a recommenda-
tion of the Minneapolis Charter Commission that the proposed
amendment not be placed on the ballot and the opinion of the
Minneapolis city attorney that the amendment would violate the
Minnesota Constitution. The mayor signed the resolution of
the city council two days later.1
2
In Minneapolis Term Limits Coalition, the court admitted that
the technical requirements necessary to submit the amendment
to qualified voters were met.3  However, the court reasoned
that by well-established rule a city council may refuse to place a
proposed amendment on the ballot when the amendment is
manifestly unconstitutional.3 4
In analyzing the constitutionality of the proposed amend-
ment, the court looked to the express language and subsequent
interpretation of Article XII, Section 6 of the Minnesota
Constitution.3 5 Article XII, Section 6 sets forth the eligibility
requirements for holding public office, including a minimum
age restriction and a residency requirement.36  In Pavlak v.
Growe,"7 Article XII, Section 6, was interpreted as establishing
universal eligibility standards for public office.' The Pavlak
court construed Article VII, Section 6 of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion as providing minimal, immutable requirements of eligibility
for elected officials that could not be made more restrictive by
legislative action in the absence of express authorization by
another constitutional provision.39  The court then distin-






34. Id.; see, e.g., Davies v. City of Minneapolis, 316 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 1982)
(upholding a Minneapolis City Council's refusal to call an election where the proposed
charter amendment was manifestly unconstitutional).
35. Minnesota Term Limits Coalition, 535 N.W.2d at 308.
36. See supra note 25.
37. 284 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 1979).
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ment for office."' The court defined a qualification as "an
element of performance requiring a particular ability on the part
of the person seeking the position, such as physical agility or the
attainment of a particular level of education."4' Conversely, the
court suggested that eligibility requirements, "have nothing to do
with one's ability to perform the duties of the office in ques-
tion. "42 Finally, the court looked to the language of Article XII,
Section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution, which provides: "[the]
legislature may provide by law for the creation, organization,
administration, consolidation, division and dissolution of local
government units.., and appointive officers including qualifica-
tion for office."4' The court concluded that because term limits
have nothing to do with the person's ability to perform the
duties of the job, term limits are eligibility requirements, and
thus are not authorized under Article XII, Section 3 as an
exception under Article VII, Section 6 guaranteeing universal
eligibility."
C. Nude Dancing and Freedom of Expression
Minnesota cities may now impose restrictions on nude
dancing in liquor establishments without violating the free
speech guarantees of the Minnesota Constitution.45 In Knud-
tson v. City of Coates,' the Minnesota Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a Coates City Ordinance prohibiting nude
dancing in liquor establishments.4 7  The court held that the
state's power to regulate liquor sales under the Twenty-first
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not limit the freedom
40. Minneapolis Term Limits Coalition v. Keefe, 535 N.W.2d 306, 309 (Minn.
1995). Although the court noted a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision supporting the
notion that a term limit is a qualification and the terms eligible and qualification are
interchangeable, the court confined its analysis to the unique language of the
Minnesota Constitution referring to eligibility in Article VII, Section 6, but "qualifica-
tions for office" in article VII, section 3. Id. at 309 n.2.
41. Id. at 309.
42. Id.
43. MINN. CONsT. Art. XII, § 3.
44. Minneapolis Term Limits Coalition, 535 N.W.2d at 309.
45. Article I, Section 3 of the Minnesota Constitution provides in pertinent part,
"[A] II persons may freely speak, write and publish their sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of such right." MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3.
46. 519 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 1994).
47. Id. at 168.
(Vol. 22
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of expression guarantees of the Minnesota Constitution.' s The
court also held that a city ordinance barring nude dancing in a
licensed liquor establishment does not violate the free speech
provision of the Minnesota Constitution when the ordinance
minimally impairs the freedom of expression by setting regula-
tions reasonable in time, place and manner.4'
In November, 1991, Eileen Knudtson, the owner of Jake's
bar, applied to the City of Coates for a liquor license.5" One
month later, Knudtson obtained a liquor license which was
effective until April of 1992.51 InJanuary 1992, shortly after the
bar opened, Knudtson began providing nude entertainment at
the bar.5 2 In April 1992, when her liquor license was up for
renewal, Knudtson applied to renew her license. 3 In response
to her renewal application, Knudtson received a letter from the
city attorney informing her of the date the renewal application
would be considered and indicating that the City Council was
concerned that the bar was in violation of the city's liquor
ordinance.54 After a public hearing, the city decided not to
renew the Knudtson's liquor license based on her violation of
the city's liquor ordinance prohibiting nude dancing in licensed
liquor establishments.55
The court in Knudtson quickly dismissed the argument that
the Twenty-first Amendment, which allows the regulation of the
48. Id.
49. Id. at 169.




54. Id. The Coates City Ordinances sections 603.01 and 603.02 (1978) provide as
follows:
Sec. 603.01, PURPOSE. The City of Coates does hereby ordain that it is in the
best interest of the public health, safety and general welfare of the people of
the City of Coates that certain types of entertainment, as hereinafter set forth,
be prohibited upon the premises of licensed liquor and beer establishments
so as to best protect and assist the owners and operators and employees
thereof, as well as the patrons thereof and public in general. Further, the City
does ordain that the standards set herein are reflective of the prevailing
community standards in the City of Coates.
Sec. 603.02, CERTAIN ACTS PROHIBITED. It shall be unlawful for any
licensee to permit or to suffer any person or persons from being upon the
licensed premises when such person does not have his or her buttocks, anus,
breast and genitals covered with a non-transparent material.
Knudtson, 519 N.W.2d at 167 n.2.
55. Knudtson, 519 N.W.2d at 167.
1996]
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sale of liquor, also allows regulation of nude dancing in liquor
establishments that would otherwise be protected speech.56
Instead, the court viewed the critical issue as whether the state
by regulating the use and sale of liquor may restrict nudity in
bars without violating the freedom of speech guarantees of the
Minnesota Constitution.57
The court reasoned that the City of Coates' adoption of the
ordinance prohibiting nude dancing was a reasonable exercise
of the City's police powers to protect "the public health, safety,
and general welfare" of the community.5 Although the nude
dancing at Jake's did not incite criminal activity so as to impli-
cate the safety of the public, the court reasoned that the city
council may have adopted the ordinance because public bars
providing nude dancing may be "offensive to community
standards of public decency," may communicate to children and
teenagers that nude dancing is socially and morally acceptable
and may provide a "subliminal endorsement for unlawful sexual
harassment."59
In reaching its decision, the court admitted that nudity is a
widespread phenomenon in video, advertising and movies, but
distinguished this type of adult entertainment with nude dancing
in bars because the latter results in "physical immediacy for the
onlooker."' The court found that the Coates ordinance was
constitutional under the Minnesota Constitution because the
hours of regulation of both nude dancing and liquor consump-
tion were identical. Furthermore, the court found the ordinance
did not altogether prohibit dancing if minimal covering of
sexually explicit body parts was provided, and the requirement
of minimal coverage of sexually explicit body parts did not
interfere with the expression of the dancers' erotic message.61
D. Psychopathic Personality Statute
The speculative nature of psychiatric predictions of danger-
ousness, and the ineffectiveness of current treatment methods
for repeat sexual offenders have sparked strong criticism of
56. Id. at 168.
57. Id.
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psychopathic personality statutes.62 Despite this criticism, the
Minnesota Supreme Court in In re Blodgett,6s upheld the consti-
tutionality of Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute.'
The Blodgett court held that civil commitment under the
Minnesota psychopathic personality statute does not violate the
substantive due process or equal protection rights of a repeat
sexual offender.'
Blodgett involved the civil commitment of repeat sex offender
PhillipJay Blodgett. Blodgett had a long history of violence and
sexual misconduct.66 In 1982, at the age of sixteen, Blodgett
was adjudicated a delinquent stemming from charges of sexual
contact with his brother.67 Within a year, Blodgett was charged
with misdemeanor battery of a social worker.' In May 1985,
Blodgett was charged and found guilty in Washington County
District Court of violating a domestic abuse restraining order.69
Four months later, Blodgett broke into the home of an ex-
girlfriend's parents, entered the room where his ex-girlfriend was
sleeping, and sexually assaulted her.70 In May 1987, Blodgett
sexually assaulted a woman during a failed attempt to steal a car
from a supermarket parking lot.71  In June 1987, while on
62. See, e.g., C. Peter Erlinder, Minnesota's Gulag: Involuntary Treatment for the
"Politically 114" 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 99 (1993). This criticism has led half of the
states that had psychopathic personality statutes to repeal them. In re Blodgett, 510
N.W. 910, 919 n.3 (Minn. 1994).
63. 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994).
64. Id. at 910. Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute defines the psychopath-
ic personality as follows:
[T]he existence in any person of such conditions of emotional
instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary
standards of goodjudgment, or failure to appreciate the consequenc-
es of personal acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to
render such person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect
to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons.
MINN. STAT. § 526.09 (1992).
65. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 910.




70. Id. Blodgett committed the crime only three hours after his release from
Washington CountyJail where he had been serving time for burglary and obstruction
of the legal process. On January 16, 1986, Blodgett pled guilty and was sent to prison
for first degree burglary for entering a dwelling with intent to commit criminal sexual
conduct. Id.
71. Id. Blodgett seized the woman and forced her into the front seat of her car.
He then placed his hand in her mouth, hit her on the side of the head, and fondled
1996]
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supervised release from a halfway house, Blodgett raped a
sixteen year old girl.72 Blodgett was sent to prison upon a
conviction of two counts of criminal sexual conduct in the
second degree.73
Prior to Blodgett's release, he was evaluated by Dr. Richard
Friberg as required under the Department of Corrections' risk
assessment and release procedures. 74 Upon completion of his
evaluation, Dr. Friberg sent a letter to the Washington County
Attorney opining that Blodgett had met the criteria for commit-
ment under the psychopathic personality statute.75 In response
to Friberg's letter, the Washington County Attorney filed a
petition for commitment.76 At the initial hearing, evidence was
received showing Blodgett was abused as a child, had an
addiction to drugs and alcohol, had elevated Minnesota Multi-
phasic Personality Inventory scores, and had refused all of the
treatment programs he had been offered.77 Five psychologists
testified at Blodgett's commitment hearing.78 All five psycholo-
gists agreed that Blodgett was dangerous, had an antisocial
personality disorder, and was chemically dependent. 79 Howev-
er, the psychologists remained divided as to whether Blodgett
met the statutory definition of a psychopathic personality.8 '
The psychologists' inconsistent conclusions relative to whether
Blodgett fit the definition of psychopathic personality were based
on the fact that each psychologist possessed a different under-
standing of the meaning of psychopathic personality." Some
of the psychologists based their conclusions strictly on the
her genital area. When the woman screamed for help, Blodgett threatened to kill her.
At the time the crime was committed, Blodgett was enrolled in a pre-release program
at Lino Lakes that allowed Blodgett to leave the prison during the day, but required
him to return at night. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The purpose of the evaluation is to identify those offenders that may be
candidates for civil commitment as psychopathic personalities or who may pose a
danger to the public. Id. at 911 n.1.
75. Id. at 911.




80. Id. Of the five experts testifying, four determined that Blodgett met the
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express language of the psychopathic personality statute, while
others incorporated case law interpreting the statutory language
to reach their determinations.8 2
Blodgett was subsequently committed to the Minnesota
Security Hospital (MSH) upon the court's finding that Blodgett
was a psychopathic personality.8 " Shortly after Blodgett's
commitment, the MSH staff filed an evaluation report as
required pursuant to Minnesota Statutes sections 526.10,
subdivision 1, and 253B.18, subdivision 2 (1992) .84 The evalua-
tion report opposed Blodgett's commitment and set forth a
diagnosis of polysubstance abuse and antisocial personality."s
On January 6, 1992, a final hearing was held. 6 At the hearing,
Blodgett moved to dismiss the proceedings on the basis that the
psychopathic personality statute was unconstitutional. 7 Several
psychiatrists testified at the hearing, including MSH senior staff
psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Farnsworth.' Farnsworth objected to
Blodgett's commitment contending that whatever treatment
Blodgett would receive at MSH would amount to nothing more
than a "'sham' or 'placebo' treatment."89
On April 2, 1992, the trial court found that Blodgett met
the criteria for commitment as a psychopathic personality and
that there were no reasonably less restrictive alternatives
available.' The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's findings that Blodgett was a psychopathic personality and
that his commitment was constitutional." Blodgett petitioned
the Minnesota Supreme Court for review challenging the
constitutionality of his commitment alleging substantive due
process and equal protection violations.
92
The supreme court in its review first examined the history
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1939. In its original form, the statute related to insane
persons instead of the dangerously insane.94 Thirty years later,
the statute was amended to include "persons mentally ill and
dangerous to the public."
95
The statute was challenged as unconstitutionally vague in
State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County.96  In
response to the contention of vagueness, the Pearson court
narrowed the statute so as to limit its reach to habitual sexual
offenders who display an "utter lack of power to control their
sexual impulses and ... are likely" to commit future attacks.97
Blodgett contended that Pearson was not controlling in light of
a number of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions restricting a
state's power to civilly confine individuals. 98  Specifically,
Blodgett asserted that under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Foucha v. Louisiana, his fundamental right to "live one's life free
of physical restraint" had been infringed.9  In Foucha, the
United States Supreme Court held that a Louisiana civil
commitment statute violated the substantive due process rights
of an individual when the individual is committed indefinitely on
the basis of dangerousness alone. 1°°
The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that Blodgett's
contention was based on the mistaken notion that Foucha
overruled Pearson without expressly saying so. 01 The court
93. Id. at 912-13.
94. Id. at 913.
95. Id.
96. 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939), aff'd 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
97. Id. at 555, 287 N.W. at 302. The Pearson court narrowed the psychopathic
personality statute by defining a psychopathic personality as follows:
[T]hose persons who, by a habitual course of misconduct in sexual
matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual
impulses and who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict
injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled
and uncontrollable desire.
Id. Based on the additional criteria enunciated by the Pearson court, the Blodgeti court
held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. B/odgett, 510 N.W.2d at 913. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
Minnesota Supreme Court holding in Pearson that the psychopathic personality statute
was not unconstitutionally vague. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Ct. of Minneapolis, 309
U.S. 270, 274 (1940) affg 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939).
98. Blodgett 510 N.W.2d at 914; see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); see alo
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979);Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
99. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914; see Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86.
100. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86.
101. Blodget, 510 N.W.2d at 914.
[V/ol. 22
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determined that Pearson was not overruled by Foucha, but instead
Pearson was a subset of Foucha's mentally ill and dangerous
category or an additional category.' °2 The court reasoned that
even though the psychopathic personality was not currently
classified as a mental illness, a psychopathic personality is
certainly more than "mere social maladjustment."10 3 The court
concluded that a psychopathic personality is "an identifiable and
documentable violent sexually deviant condition or disor-
der." 
04
The court then applied the Pearson test to determine
whether Blodgett fit within the definition of psychopathic
personality. 5 Application of the Pearson test involves the
court's consideration of a number of factors including:
[T]he nature and frequency of the sexual assaults, the degree
of violence involved, the relationship (or lack thereof)
between the offender and the victims, the offender's attitude
and mood, the offender's medical and family history, the
results of psychological and psychiatric testing and evaluation,
and such other factors that bear on the predatory sex impulse
and the lack of power to control it.'0 6
Upon considering the Pearson factors, the court determined that
Blodgett was a psychopathic personality. 10 7
Additionally, Blodgett argued that civil commitment as a
psychopathic personality condition will result in life-long
preventive detention because the condition is not treatable.1
0 8
Although the court recognized that treatment is problemat-
ic,"° the court stated that the lack of documentation of suc-
cessful treatment did not diminish the state's compelling interest
in protecting the citizens of the state."0 The court reasoned
that as long as the individual is offered treatment with frequent
102. Id.
103. Id. The court noted that the third edition of the American Psychiatric
Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders describes the behavior
relative to antisocial personality disorder as sometimes including sexual promiscuity.
Id. at 915 n.7.




108. Id. at 916.
109. The court stated that it was unclear whether treatment for psychopathic
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reviewal, the individual's due process rights are met. 1 '
Finally, Blodgett asserted that his equal protection rights
had been infringed based on the disparate treatment between
sexual offenders who have completed their sentences and other
equally dangerous criminals who were not medically recognized
as mentally ill." 2 Because the fundamental right of liberty was
involved, the court applied the strict scrutiny test requiring a
compelling governmental interest."1 3 The court quickly deter-
mined that the safety of the public constituted a compelling
governmental interest."' In reaching its decision, the court
admitted the lack of scientific knowledge relative to repeat
sexual offenders, however the court asserted that the criminal
justice system can deal with repeat sexual offenders in two ways:
by enhanced criminal sentences or civil commitment."5 The
court noted that it had already upheld the Legislature's enact-





112. Id. Amicus, Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, argued in its brief that
committing psychopathic personalities and not other recidivist criminals, including
arsonists and murderers results in inequitable treatment. Id. at 917.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 918.
115. Id. at 917.
116. Id. at 918.
[Vol. 22
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